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NOTES
TOWARDS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
COUNSEL IN MATRIMONIAL LITIGATION
I. Introduction
The marriage institution is the basic unit in the anotomical com-
position of American society as it exists today. The right to marry
and the right to divorce when marriage has failed have long been
held in the highest esteem by our nation's courts.' But some citizens
of the State of New York are judicially denied the right to terminate
their marriages because they are indigents.
In In re Boyd2 61 indigent residents of Bronx County applied for
assignment of counsel to advise and represent them in divorce ac-
tions without fee. The New York Supreme Court stated that section
1102(a) of the Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) expressly au-
thorizes an assignment of counsel;3 that such assignments were
within the "broad discretionary power" of the court in matrimonial
actions;4 and that the assistance of counsel was unquestionable nec-
essary for these prospective matrimonial litigants.5 Yet the court
denied the requested assignments of counsel.'
The fate of the applicants was controlled by the constitutional
decision of the New York Court of Appeals in In re Smiley' that
1. E.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967);
Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
2. 174 N.Y.L.J. 10 (Sup. Ct. Nov. 6, 1975).
3. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 1102(a) (McKinney Supp. 1975) reads: "The court in its order
permitting a person to proceed as a poor person may assign an attorney." Such statutes codify
the inherent power of the courts to appoint an attorney on a discretionary basis. In re Smiley,
36 N.Y.2d 433, 438, 330 N.E.2d 53, 55, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87, 91 (1975); People ex rel. Acritelli v.
Grout, 87 App. Div. 193, 195-96, 84 N.Y.S. 97, 100-01 (1st. Dept. 1903), aff'd, 177 N.Y. 587,
70 N.E. 1105 (1904).
4. In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 441, 330 N.E.2d 53, 88, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87, 94 (1975).
5. The Court stated:
.Unquestionably, the assistance of counsel is necessary for these prospective matri-
monial litigants. . . . [A]ssistance of counsel is particularly important in matri-
monial proceedings not only to protect the parties in any litigation but in any settle-
ment negotiations regarding child custody and child support as well.
174 N.Y.L.J. at 10 (citation omitted).
6. Id.
7. 36 N.Y.2d 433, 330 N.E.2d 53, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1975).
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article eleven of the CPLR affords no absolute right to assignment
of counsel in poor person applications! The Smiley court concluded
that discretionary assignment of counsel in appropriate cases was
all that was constitutionally required.'
The first problem posed by the decision in Smiley is that it oper-
ates as a virtual denial of counsel to indigent matrimonial litigants.
Moreover, regardless of whether the assignment of counsel is man-
datory or discretionary, some provision for compensating such coun-
sel is required if there is to be a viable system of providing represen-
tation for the indigent matrimonial litigant in New York.
II. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases
The indigent's right to counsel in criminal cases is based upon the
sixth amendment of the United States Constitution'" which is
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. In
Powell v. Alabama" the United States Supreme Court held that
the failure to provide effective counsel in a capital case violated the
sixth amendment and was a deprivation of due process. The Court
held that the assistance of counsel in a capital case was within the
"fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base
of all our civil and political institutions."' 2
The Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainwright" extended this pro-
tection to those accused of a felony. 4 Ultimately, in Argersinger v.
Hamlin,'5 the right to counsel was granted to defendants charged
with misdemeanors. At present the criminal defendant has the
right to counsel in all cases in which there is the possibility of a
deprivation of his personal liberty through the criminal prosecution
of the state.
8. 174 N.Y.L.J. at 10.
9. 36 N.Y.2d at 438, 330 N.E.2d at 55, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 91. See 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 139
(1975).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
11. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
12. Id. at 67.
13. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
14. The Supreme Court's opinion did not restrict the right to counsel announced in
Gideon to felony cases alone. See Note, The Indigent's "Right" to Counsel in Civil Cases, 43
FORDHAM L. REV. 989, 989-90 (1975).
15. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
16. Id. at 37. Several states had already extended the Gideon decision to offenses less
serious than felonies. See Note, supra note 14, at 990 n.8.
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The sixth amendment expressly applies only to criminal cases.,7
However, on several occasions the Supreme Court has used both due
process and equal protection to expand the rights of criminal defen-
dants in situations not covered by the sixth amendment.
In Griffin v. Illinois" the Supreme Court held that due process
and equal protection required that an indigent defendant be fur-
nished a free transcript for appellate review. To deny a defendant
materials necessary for an appeal solely because of his inability to
pay was considered to be an invidious discrimination. 9
In Douglas v. California the Supreme Court decided that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment required the assign-
ment of counsel for a criminal defendant's appeal.2 In holding that
the fourteenth amendment due process clause may afford a right to
counsel beyond that granted by the sixth amendment, the Supreme
Court has raised the possibility that the due process clause may
require the extension of similar rights to civil litigants despite the
absence of a sixth amendment mandate. 2
Since the due process clauses of both the fifth and fourteenth
amendments are concerned with deprivations of life, liberty, and
property there seems to be no justification for any civil-criminal
distinction in the application of the rights which are constitution-
ally mandated by due process. If the guarantees of the Bill of Rights
apply equally to civil as well as criminal proceedings, the rights
applicable through those amendments cannot be restricted to crimi-
nal cases alone. 23
17. U.S. CONST. amend. VI reads in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
• . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." See, e.g., United States v. Wilcox, 507
F.2d 364 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 979 (1975); Hullom v. Burrows, 266 F.2d 547
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 919 (1959).
18. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
19. Id. at 18.
20. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
21. Id. at 357-58. A state requirement that appointment of counsel on appeal was merely
discretionary was found to unjustly discriminate against the indigent on the basis of wealth.
The Supreme Court held this to be an unconstitutional line between the "rich and poor." Id.
at 358.
22. See Sandoval v. Rattikin, 395 S.W.2d 889, 895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (Sharpe, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 901 (1966); Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation,
66 COLUM. L. REV. 1322 (1966).
23. Inker & Perretta, A Child's Right to Counsel in Custody Cases, 55 MAss. L. Q. 229,
236 (1970). It has been contended that certain mandatory rights afforded criminal defend-
ants, such as the right to counsel, are even more of a necessity in civil cases. Since a judge
19761
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III. The Erosion of Civil-Criminal Distinctions
The trend has been clearly toward the rejection of the distinction
between civil and criminal cases for the purpose of applying the
protections of the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments to indigent litigants.
By far the most litigated area of the law in which fourteenth
amendment due process has been applied to require the mandatory
assignment of counsel for indigents has been in child custody
cases.24 In State v. Jamison25 the Supreme Court of Oregon held that
there was a right to counsel in child custody cases which required
that an indigent mother whose parental rights were being termi-
nated be assigned counsel even though by statute such appoint-
ments were formerly discretionary.2" In Danforth v. State Depart-
ment of Health and Welfare27 the Maine Supreme Court held that
an indigent parent seeking to regain custody of a child from a state
welfare department was denied due process by the state's refusal to
assign counsel.2" The court rejected the civil-criminal distinctions
that may be made on the basis of the sixth amendment right to
counsel in criminal cases.2" Due process comes into operation when-
ever the consequences of the action seriously affect a person's funda-
mental rights.' In the Danforth case the possibility of a parent
being deprived of the custody of a child was held to be a punishment
potentially more severe than imprisonment.3
In certain classes of civil cases the fundamental rights of litigants
are often no less in jeopardy than the rights of a criminal defendant
who is brought to trial. In recognition of this fact, the Supreme
in a civil case must be neutral, the amount of protection he can extend to an unrepresented
indigent is limited because of a possible charge of bias. Note, supra note 22, at 1331-32.
24. See, e.g., Note, Parents' Right to Counsel in Dependency and Neglect Proceedings,
49 IND. L.J. 167 (1973); Note, The Indigent Parent's Right to Appointed Counsel in Actions
to Terminate Parental Rights, 43 U. CIN. L. REV. 635 (1974).
25. 251 Ore. 114, 444 P.2d 15 (1968).
26. Id. at 116-17, 444 P.2d at 16-17.
27. 303 A.2d 794 (Me. 1973).
28. Id. at 800-01.
29. Id. at 799-800; see Note, supra note 14, at 996.
30. Note, The Indigent's Expanding Right to Appointed Counsel, 37 ALBANY L. R~v. 383,
395 (1973).
31. 303 A.2d at 800; accord, In re Ella B., 30 N.Y.2d 352, 285 N.E.2d 288, 334 N.Y.S.2d
133 (1972) (parent's concern for the liberty of a child involves a fundamental right and
interest).
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Court has used due process and equal protection "to require the
provision by the state of. . . trial related services in certain coercive
situations.""
IV. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process in Matrimonial
Litigation
In Boddie v. Connecticut3 indigent spouses who wanted to sue for
divorce but were unable to pay the court fees and costs for service
of process required for the commencement of litigation34 sought a
declaration that such fee requirements were an unconstitutional
denial of access to the courts. 5
The Supreme Court held that the fee requirements were violative
of due process and equal protection and, as such, were an unconsti-
tutional denial of access to the courts to prospective indigent matri-
monial litigants.36 The Court emphasized the importance of due
process in matrimonial litigation:"
Our conclusion is that, given the basic position of the marriage relationship
in this society's hierarchy of values and the concomitant state monopoliza-
tion of the means for legally dissolving this relationship, due process does
prohibit a State from denying, solely because of inability to pay, access to
its courts to individuals who seek judicial dissolution of their marriages.
The Supreme Court noted that marriage "involves interests of
32. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (waiver of filing fees for indigent seeking
divorce); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (counsel at juvenile delinquency hearing); Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (counsel for indigent at appellate level); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956) (free transcript for appellate review); see Note, Parents' Right to Counsel in
Dependency and Neglect Proceedings, supra note 24, at 168-69.
In certain other areas courts have recognized a right to counsel for indigents. United States
v. Sun Kung Kang, 468 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1972) (right to counsel in civil contempt proceed-
ing); accord, Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968) (right to counsel at civil
commitment proceeding); People ex rel. Rogers v. Stanley, 17 N.Y.2d 256, 217 N.E.2d 636,
270 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1966). But see Brown v. Lavine, 37 N.Y.2d 317, 333 N.E.2d 374, 372
N.Y.S.2d 75 (1975) (no right to counsel for recipient of public assistance at administrative
hearing to discontinue aid). For a discussion of the state of the right to counsel in probation
hearings, see 27 MERCER L. REV. 325 (1975).
33. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
34. The average cost to a litigant being $60.00 of which $45.00 was payable to the clerk of
the court and an average of $15.00 was payable to the sheriff for service of process. Id. at 372.
35. Id.; see Note, A First Amendment Right of Access to the Courts for Indigents, 82 YALE
L.J. 1055 (1973).
36. 401 U.S. at 374.
37. Id.
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basic importance in our society.",, Moreover, the Court was una-
ware of any jurisdiction where marriages may be dissolved without
invoking the state's judicial machinery. 9
Because the state courts were the only avenue to the dissolution
of petitioners' marriages,' the Boddie court concluded that resort
to the judicial process by these plaintiffs "is no more voluntary in a
realistic sense than that of the defendant called upon to defend his
interests in court."'" If indeed the position of matrimonial litigants
before the courts so closely approximates that of a criminal defen-
dant, it is not unreasonable to perceive the application of a due
process right to counsel in matrimonial cases which is analagous to
the protections afforded the criminal defendant by the sixth amend-
ment.42
In Boddie the Supreme Court struck down as a denial of due
process the fee requirements which were payable to the state as a
condition to access to the courts in a matrimonial action.43 In so
doing the Court clearly implied that any and all barriers to access
to the courts in matrimonial actions were vulnerable to attack on
the basis of due process.
The unique position of matrimonial matters in the courts was
reaffirmed in a recent New York Supreme Court matrimonial case,
Jeffreys v. Jeffreys."
[Ain action for divorce is fundamentally different from actions in contract
or concerning real property. The latter may be brought or not brought; they
may be settled out of court. But our State Constitution . . . mandates that
divorces may be granted only by due judicial proceedings.'"
38. Id. at 376; see, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
39. 401 U.S. at 376. For a discussion of the relationship between state monopolization of
the power to grant divorce as opposed to that of other areas of the law such as bankruptcy
and appropriate due process protection, see Note, The Heirs of Boddie: Court Access For
Indigents After Kras and Ortwein, 8 HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-Civ. LiB. L. REv. 571 (1973).
40. N.Y. CONST. art. I § 9 is a typical example of state monopolization of divorce actions
and reads in part: "INior shall any divorce be granted otherwise than by due judicial
proceedings .
41. 401 U.S. at 376-77.
42. Cf. Comment, Providing Legal Services for the Middle Class In Civil Matters: The
Problem, The Duty and a Solution, 26 U. oF PiTT. L. REV. 811, 824 (1965) in which the author
states that the minimal requirements of due process are notice and a fair hearing.
43. 401 U.S. at 374.
44. 58 Misc.2d 1045, 296 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 38 App.
Div. 2d 431, 330 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1972).
45. Id. at 1051, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 82.
NOTES
V. New York Marital Law Decisions After Boddie
The New York courts have cautiously probed the area of due
process rights of indigent matrimonial litigants. At first the New
York Court of Appeals seemed to indicate a readiness to follow the
implicit mandate for expansion of such rights which was apparent
in the Boddie decision. In Deason v. Deason" the court unanimously
held that in a matrimonial action an indigent's cost of service of
process by publication should be borne by the local governing unit
even though the expense in question was payable to a third party,
i.e. newspapers, rather than to the state." The rationale of Boddie
was deemed controlling because the effect of indigency was the same
in each case: a denial of access to the courts.4"
Boddie and Deason involved the payment of fees rather than the
issue of the assignment of counsel, but the implication was inescap-
able that the payment of fees was not the only unconstitutional
barrier which denied indigents of due process.49 Due process, as
stated by the Supreme Court in Boddie, requires at a minimum that
"persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the
judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be
heard."5 However, the Supreme Court has recognized that "[t]he
right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel."'" Therefore the right
to counsel in matrimonial cases can arguably be seen as an integral
element of the right to access to the courts.
With the potential far-reaching ramifications of both the Boddie
and Deason cases as precedents, it was only a matter of time until
a constitutional decision on the issue of mandatory assignment of
counsel would have to be made.
That question was decided by the New York Court of Appeals in
46. 32 N.Y.2d 93, 296 N.E.2d 229, 343 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1973).
47. Id. at 94-95, 296 N.E.2d at 230, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 322.
48. Id. The court reasoned as such despite the fact that Boddie did not decide that state
or local government should bear the cost of publication and that the Legislature had not
spoken on the issue.
49. The cost of retaining counsel can be considered to foreclose a party's meaningful
opportunity to be heard and therefore to be a denial of due process. In re Robinson, 8 Cal.
App. 3d 783, 87 Ca. Rptr. 678 (Ct. App. 1070), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 954 (1971).
50. 401 U.S. at 377.
51. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932). See also In re Ella B., 30 N.Y.2d 352,
285 N.E.2d 288, 334 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1972) in which the same reasoning was applied to an
indigent's right to counsel in a civil custody case.
1976]
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In re Smiley. 2 In Smiley both an indigent plaintiff wife and an
indigent defendant wife applied to have the County of Tompkins,
New York, either provide them with counsel or compensate counsel
retained by them. After examining the history of the sixth amend-
ment decisions, the court of appeals concluded: "These cases
recognize that the right to counsel in criminal cases means . . . that
in the event of inability by a defendant to provide his own counsel
. . .the State must provide counsel . . . .. The court of appeals
held that no similar provision applies to "private litigation," 4 and
that there would be no assignment of counsel in matrimonial actions
as a matter of constitutional right in New York.5
While the court of appeals noted that it was within the power of
the courts to assign counsel in appropriate civil cases, the court
stated "there is no absolute right to assigned counsel; whether in a
particular case counsel shall be assigned lies instead in the discre-
tion of the court. 5 6
The court indicated that the Legislature had not provided for
publicly compensated counsel in civil litigation and, absent such
action, the courts of New York did not have power to appropriate
and provide funds for assignments of counsel in matrimonial cases. 7
By emphasizing the lack of action on the part of the Legislature
the court allowed the practical consideration of the lack of funds to
influence its decision as to whether there indeed was a constitu-
tional right to counsel in divorce actions. The court seemed to rule
not on the issue of whether due process required a right to counsel
in matrimonial actions, but on whether such a right and its concom-
itant cost could be afforded.
The court of appeals in Smiley narrowly construed both Boddie
and Deason to apply only to the particular facts of those cases: a
52. 36 N.Y.2d 433, 330 N.E.2d 53, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1975).
53. Id. at 437, 330 N.E.2d at 55, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
54. Id. at 438, 330 N.E.2d at 55, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
55. The Smiley majority did not feel compelled to consider alternate measures that might
be necessary to provide counsel for indigents because of its assumption that effective repre-
sentation could be accomplished through the assignment of uncompensated counsel or legal
aid. 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 139, 145-146 (1975).
56. 36 N.Y.2d at 438, 330 N.E.2d at 55, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 91.
57. Id. at 439, 330 N.E.2d at 56, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 92. In 1974 a bill was presented to the
New York Legislature which would have provided for the compensation of assigned counsel
for matrimonial defendants. However, no action was taken. Menin v. Menin, 79 Misc. 2d 285,
288 n.1, 359 N.Y.S.2d 721, 725 n.1 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
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state could not restrict access to its courts in matrimonial actions
by exacting certain fees from prospective indigent matrimonial liti-
gants.5" Since counsel was not an absolute condition for access to the
courts, the Smiley court held that Boddie could not be used to
impose an obligation on the part of the state to assign or compensate
counsel as a matter of constitutional right. 9
The court realizing that assistance of counsel would be essential
in certain matrimonial actions, stated that the indigent litigant in
such cases had recourse to legal aid"° and other agencies which, in
the City of New York "handle annually a large number of matri-
monial cases." 6' Anticipating that such facilities might become
hopelessly over-taxed, the court stated that in such a case the ag-
grieved party could look only to the Legislature "which has the
power to appropriate the funds required for publicly-compensated
counsel."62
The Smiley court refused to recognize a significant distinction
between the status of matrimonial litigants and others who appear
before the courts in civil actions.63 The court stated: "In short, the
problem is not peculiar to matrimonial litigation. The horizon does
not stop at matrimonial or any other species of private litigation." 4
In doing so, the court ignored the fact that the Supreme Court in
Boddie drew a clear distinction between matrimonial and other civil
litigation. In fact, the Court in Boddie could not distinguish matri-
monial litigants from criminal defendants for the purpose of due
process protection of their rights.65 The failure to recognize the spe-
58. 36 N.Y.2d at 439, 339 N.E.2d at 56, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 92.
59. Id.
60. For a discussion of the inadequacy of the legal aid system which operates with both
public and private funds to cope with the increasing needs of the poor, see Note, supra note
22.
61. 36 N.Y.2d at 440, 330 N.E.2d at 57, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 93.
62. Id. The court of appeals stated:
If more is required, the relief must be provided by the Legislature. The fundamental
is that the courts constitute but one branch of government. The absence of appropri-
ated funds and legislation to raise taxes under our State constitutional systems, as in
the rest of the Union, is not a judicially-fillable gap.
Id. at 441-42, 330 N.E.2d at 58, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 94.
63. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971); Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 58 Misc.2d
1045, 1051, 296 N.Y.S.2d 74, 82 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
64. 36 N.Y.2d at 441, 330 N.E.2d at 57, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 93.
65. See text accompanying notes 42-44 supra.
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cial status of matrimonial litigation is simply without basis in the
law."
In actuality the failure of the Legislature to provide funds for the
compensation of assigned counsel was the basis for the court's re-
fusal to declare a mandatory right to counsel in matrimonial cases.
The court was unwilling to place the burden of representing indigent
matrimonial litigants upon the private bar without the "possibility
of. . . compensation.""
The Smiley decision by the court of appeals was not without
dissent. Judge Jones and Judge Wachtler would have recognized the
right of indigents to the assistance of counsel in seeking dissolution
of their marriages." Judge Jones interpreted the majority's position
as an "impermissible retreat" from the fundamental principles rec-
ognized in Boddie and Deason.6 5
In criticizing the court's narrow interpretation of those two cases,
Judge Jones urged the court to take heed of the due process implied
in Boddie and Deason.7 0
I find nothing in either case to warrant any conclusion that it is only certain
barriers that are to be eliminated or that hinderance to the availability of the
judicial process is to be eliminated only if to do so will entail an economic
burden of modest dimension ....
The difference in character of the particular obstacle considered
in Smiley, i.e., the right to assignment of counsel, from the more
basic obstacle of the fee requirements considered in Boddie and
Deason, appears to be the only explanation for the difference in the
results of the two cases. The court of appeals saw no conflict in
providing indigents with an opportunity to be heard without insur-
ing that it be a meaningful one. Judge Jones, in commenting upon
this situation, stated: 7'
To my mind it is both artificial and constitutionally impermissible to say
that the State may not deny "access" . . . but, entrance having been permit-
ted, the State may then deny effective presence and participation ....
66. Justice Black in his dissent in Boddie intimated that he would not give marital actions
any special preference over other types of civil litigation. 401 U.S. at 389.
67. 36 N.Y.2d at 441, 330 N.E.2d at 57, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 94.
68. Id. at 442, 330 N.E.2d at 58, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 94 (Jones, J., dissenting).
69. Id., 330 N.E.2d at 58, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 95.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 443, 330 N.E.2d at 59, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 96.
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"[Tihe right to be heard would be 'of little avail if it did not comprehend
the right to be heard by counsel.' "
Judge Jones contended that the judiciary had the responsibility
and power to find a right to counsel in matrimonial cases and leave
the determination of how the required legal services shall be made
available to the Legislature.72 Judge Jones stated it was the function
of the courts to declare the right to counsel in matrimonial litiga-
tion; it was for the Legislature to consider what would be the most
practical method of providing that right.
In holding that there was no constitutional right to counsel in
divorce actions because of their "private" nature, the court of ap-
peals has construed Boddie too narrowly. In Boddie the Supreme
Court explicitly noted that state monopolization of the means of
obtaining a divorce made resort to the courts by matrimonial liti-
gants no more voluntary than that of a criminal defendant defend-
ing his interests in court." If this is the correct analysis of the nature
of an action for divorce, there is a constitutional right tocounsel in
divorce actions brought by indigents.
Secondly, as Judge Jones stated in his dissent, the failure of the
Legislature to provide the funds necessary to finance assignments
of counsel in matrimonial actions has no real bearing on whether or
not such assignments are constitutionally required. If a mandatory
right to counsel in matrimonial cases is indeed constitutionally re-
quired, the court must enunciate that right and leave the practical
matter of financing such assistance to the Legislature.
If the courts of New York would provide a very liberal discretion-
ary assignment of counsel in all actions where there was a reason-
able possibility of prejudice to an unrepresented litigant's rights,
the rights of indigent matrimonial litigants could still be adequately
protected. But this has not occurred.
VI. The Adverse Consequences of Smiley
The adverse consequences of the Smiley decision under condi-
tions as they presently exist in New York were made all to a clear
in In re Boyd.74
72. Id. at 443-44, 330 N.E.2d at 60, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 97.
73. 401 U.S. at 376-77.
74. 174 N.Y.L.J. 10 (Sup. Ct. Nov. 6, 1975).
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In Boyd 61 indigent plaintiffs filed ex parte applications to pro-
ceed as poor persons in actions for divorce and to obtain assignment
of counsel to advise and represent them in such actions without fee.
Because the operative facts and legal issues presented were shared
in common by all the applicants, their suits were consolidated for
disposition by the supreme court.7"
The applications were prepared and submitted pro se with the
help of the Legal Aid Society. 8 Each application was supported by
an affidavit of the applicant setting forth his or her" name and
address, the date and place of marriage, the names and ages of any
minor children, the amount and sources of income and property, a
statement showing the duration of residency in New York State, a
statement of facts showing a cause of action for divorce, and an
account of the applicant's unsuccessful efforts to obtain counsel for
the purpose of initiating an action for divorce. Each application was
accompanied by an affirmation of the Attorney-in-Charge of the
Legal Aid Society's Neighborhood Office stating that he had exam-
ined the facts of each case and believed there was merit to the
proposed action, and, despite the fact that the applicant qualified
for the free legal services of the Society, the office was unable to
accept the case because of a lack of resources and personnel." The
court then granted the applications to the extent that the parties
were permitted to proceed as poor persons under article eleven.79
The requests for assignment of counsel, however, were denied; su-
preme court Judge Cotton noting that he was bound by the decision
of the court of appeals in Smiley that there was no mandatory right
to counsel in divorce actions."
75. 174 N.Y.L.J. at 10.
76. The Legal Aid Society's Bronx Neighborhood Office maintains a substantial docket
of matrimonial matters totalling hundreds of cases each year and is apparently the only
facility in Bronx County presently rendering free legal services in divorce matters. Id.
77. Fifty-three of the applicants were women; eight were men. Id.
78. The attorney's affirmation detailed the office's inability to accept the cases at bar.
The Bronx office currently possesses an active docket in excess of 300 matrimonial matters,
with a further waiting list of 600 other individuals who have been given appointments at the
rate of 20 per week through February, 1976. Id. These facts, combined with the added consid-
eration that matrimonial matters are but one of the many areas of the law handled by the
10-attorney office, presented a clear showing of the office's inability to accept the cases at
bar.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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After examining the ability of both the private bar and legal aid
in Bronx County to accommodate the discretionary assignment of
the applicant's cases, Judge Cotton concluded that it was not a
realistic option to compel members of the bar to accept uncompen-
sated assignment of these cases."s Such assignment would impose an
intolerable burden on the Bronx matrimonial bar in the volume
presented here. 2
The court, stating that the situation was "an unfortunate reflec-
tion of the chronically inadequate legal services resources available
to the indigent population of the Bronx,"83 refused to compel legal
aid to represent these applicants. 4
Judge Cotton had the discretionary power to assign counsel in
poor person actions. But no public or private agency capable of
giving constitutionally adequate assistance to the applicants ex-
isted. 5 In short, absent funding there could be no assignment of
counsel in Bronx County, discretionary or otherwise. The court of
appeals' decision in Smiley, when considered in the light of the
situation presented in Boyd, acts effectively to deny indigents the
assistance of counsel in even the most necessary cases."
The facts in Boyd are illustrative of the common problem and
they present a cold truth: the present facilities of public and private
legal aid programs are grossly inadequate to accept assignment of
the volume of indigent matrimonial cases that exist. 7 At the time
of the Boyd case, the ten-attorney Bronx Neighborhood Legal Aid
81. Id. See In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 441, 330 N.E.2d 53, 58, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87, 94
(1975); Vanderpool v. Vanderpool, 74 Misc. 2d 122, 344 N.Y.S.2d 572 (Sup. Ct. 1973). But
see Bartlett v. Kitchin, 76 Misc. 2d 1087, 1091, 352 N.Y.S.2d 110, 114 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
82. 174 N.Y.L.J. at 10.
83. Id.
84. See note 78 supra and accompanying text.
85. In Wallace v. Kern, 392 F. Supp. 834 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd 481 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 947 (1975) the court stated that legal aid lawyers could not handle more
than 40 cases at any one time and still satisfy the constitutional mandate of effective assis-
tance of counsel. See Note, Caseload Ceilings on Indigent Defense Systems to Ensure Effec-
tive Assistance of Counsel, 43 U. CIN. L. REv. 185, 188 (1974).
86. In eleven of the cases in Boyd the applicants were unable to read or speak the English
language. Since under N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 2101(b) (McKinney 1968) all papers must be
prepared and filed in the English language it would seem to be incumbent upon the court to
appoint counsel in these cases. In recognition of this Judge Cotton stated: "For these prospec-
tive litigants, the prospect of proceeding without counsel was effectively foreclosed." 174
N.Y.L.J. at 10.
87. See note 78 supra and accompanying text.
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Office possessed an active docket in excess of 300 matrimonial mat-
ters, with a further waiting list of 600 other individuals."
Since the practice is to give criminal matters preference over
matrimonial and other civil cases, the existing facilities in the Bronx
were undisputably inadequate to accept the assignment of the 61
cases at the bar.89
VII. Attorney Compensation and the Need For Legislative
Reform
The problem of attorney compensation is central to the establish-
ment of a right to counsel in matrimonial litigation, whether such
right is mandatory or discretionary. The refusal of the court to as-
sign indigent matrimonial cases to either the private bar or legal aid
is based solely on the lack of resources. Assigning such cases with-
out hope of compensation to the matrimonial bar presents the possi-
bility of violating the constitutional rights of the lawyers so as-
signed.90
The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits
the taking of property without just compensation.9 It has tradition-
ally been held that attorneys in undertaking the practice of law
impliedly consent to accept the responsibility of representing those
who by reason of their indigency cannot adequately provide for re-
tained counsel." In a typical illustration of this reasoning one New
York court has stated: "Attorneys, unlike newspaper editors . ..
are officers of the court."9 A growing number, but still a minority
of jurisdictions,94 have held that an attorney appointed by the court
88. 174 N.Y.L.J. at 10.
89. The simple solution is to take the worthy cases first come, first served, until compe-
tancy is imperiled, then close the doors. Samore, Legal Services For the Poor, 32 ALBANY L.
REV. 509, 514 (1968). This is exactly the effect of the Boyd decision.
90. In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 441,330 N.E.2d 53, 58, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87, 94 (1975); Menin
v. Menin, 79 Misc. 2d 285, 359 N.Y.S.2d 721 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
91. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
92. Jackson v. State, 413 P.2d 488 (Alaska 1966); Weiner v. Fulton County, 113 Ga. App.
343, 148 S.E.2d 143 (2d Div.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 958 (1966).
93. Bartlett v. Kitchin, 76 Misc.2d 1087, 1091, 352 N.Y.S.2d 110, 114 (Sup. Ct. 1973). See
Note, supra note 14, at 1002 n.80.
94. Indiana, Iowa, and Wisconsin have for some time recognized an enforceable right to
compensation. Knox County Council v. State ex rel. McCormick, 217 Ind. 493, 29 N.E.2d 405
(1940); Ferguson v. Pottawattamie County, 224 Iowa 516, 278 N.W. 223 (1938); County of
Dane v. Smith, 13 Wis. 585 (1861). But see Woodbury County v. Anderson, 164 N.W.2d 129
(Iowa 1969); Green Lake County v. Waupaca County, 113 Wis. 425, 89 N.W. 549 (1902).
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to represent an indigent has a right to be compensated."
The New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Rush" held that the
State rather than the private bar had the duty to compensate as-
signed counsel in a criminal case.97 The trend is toward a recognition
of this principle;" but as yet, the principle has not been carried over
to the area of civil assignments.9 Two New York appellate cases
have held that without provision by the legislature the courts have
no power to provide compensation for assigned counsel in matri-
monial litigation.'"" However, in Vanderpool v. Vanderpool",' a trial
court held that it was the responsibility of local government to com-
pensate such assigned counsel. The Vanderpool court stated that
the burden of representing an indigent wife should not be imposed
upon private counsel without consent.' °
Clearly, the provision of funds for the assignment of counsel is
crucial to any system created to provide representation for indigents
whether it is discretionary or otherwise. While the courts have the
power to declare an absolute right to counsel in matrimonial actions
or to assign counsel on a discretionary basis, the practical problem
of financing such representation can be disposed of only by the
Legislature. 03 In the Boyd case assignment of counsel was denied
because of a lack of resources and for no other reason. It is difficult
to imagine more needy cases. Eleven of the applicants in Boyd were
unable to speak or read the English language.0 4 Unquestionably
95. Note, supra note 14, at 1005; see, e.g., Menin v. Menin, 79 Misc. 2d 285, 359 N.Y.S.2d
721 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Bedford v. Salt Lake County, 22 Utah 2d 12, 447 P.2d 193 (1968). The
right of assigned counsel to compensation was implicitly recognized by the Supreme Court
in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973). The Court in considering the right to counsel of
an indigent in a parole revocation hearing noted that one factor to be considered in requiring
the assistance of counsel is "the financial cost to the State." Id. at 788.
96. 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966).
97. Id. at 412, 217 A.2d at 448.
98. See Bradshaw v. Ball, 487 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1972); State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 571
(Mo. 1971).
99. See Note, supra note 14, at 1004.
100. Cerami v. Cerami, 44 App. Div. 2d 890, 355 N.Y.S.2d 861 (4th Dept. 1974); Jacox v.
Jacox, 43 App. Div. 2d 716, 350 N.Y.S.2d 435 (2d Dept. 1973).
101. 74 Misc. 2d 122, 344 N.Y.S.2d 572 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
102. Id. at 125, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 574.
103. See note 62 supra. Other legislatures have acted to provide compensation for assigned
counsel in civil matters. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1970); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 925.035 (1973);
N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 35(1)(a),(2) (McKinney 1968), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1975).
104. 174 N.Y.L.J. at 10.
19761
530 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. IV
those applicants were effectively denied the guarantee of Boddie;
"meaningful access" to the courts.'"'
VIII. Conclusion
Indigent matrimonial litigants are being denied meaningful ac-
cess to the courts. The expense of providing such access does not
justify the failure of the courts to require appointment of counsel for
deserving indigent litigants. The failure of the New York Legislature
to face the pressing problem of financing assignments of counsel is
likewise intolerable. These problems as illustrated by Boyd make it
incumbent upon the court of appeals to reconsider its decision in
Smiley and declare a constitutional right to counsel in matrimonial
litigation.
Gary R. Matano
105. Id.
